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Australia’s National Electricity Market operates in one of the world’s longest 
and stringiest transmission networks.  The 2016-2020 investment supercycle, 
in which 13,000 MW of renewables were committed, is slowly revealing the 
limits of network hosting capacity for renewable plant.  In this article, side-
effects arising from the supercycle are analysed.  The majority sources of 
renewable investment failure relate to deteriorating system strength, viz. 
associated connection lags, remediation and curtailment costs.  Although a 
multi-zonal market, the NEMs locational investment signals remain visibly 
strong.  A change to nodal arrangements may refine dispatch efficiency but 
the bigger policy problem is rapidly diminishing network hosting capacity for 
new renewables, imperfect regulation and regulatory lag associated with 
augmentation.  Markets participants seek to move faster than regulatory 
frameworks allow.  Renewable Energy Zones (REZ) are examined through 
both i). a consumer-funded regulatory model and ii). a renewable generator-
funded market model.  A ‘super-sized concessional mezzanine’ facility is 
presented as a critical element of REZ capital funding.  It forms the means by 
which to optimise market-based REZ transmission augmentation and 
moderate sponsor risks of transient underutilisation. 
 
Key words:  Electricity, Renewable Energy Zones, transmission investment, 
locational investment signals. 
 
JEL Classification:  D25, D80, G32, L51, Q41. 
 
1. Introduction 
Rising market shares of utility-scale wind and solar PV is placing pressure on 
transmission networks and energy market designs in Australia, Europe, Great Britain 
and the US, amongst other jurisdictions.  In the Australian case, a surge of VRE 
entrants with sporadic episodes of investment failure brought the adequacy of 
locational investment signals into sharp focus. 
 
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM), a real-time energy-only gross pool, 
operates in one of the longest and stringiest transmission networks in the world.  The 
NEM is also one of the fastest transitioning power systems given a historic 
dominance of coal generation.  From 2012-2016, 5000MW (~20%) of base load coal 
plant exited with little warning.  Over the same period Australian policy discontinuity 
left a 20% Renewable Energy Target (by 2020) technically under-supplied.  These 
events produced sharp increases in both electricity and renewable certificate prices.  
A sizeable supply-side response followed – 13,000MW of new projects across 121 
sites totalling AUD$23 billion1 – all in a 4-year window. Given a 35,000MW power 
system demand, it presented as an investment ‘supercycle’. 
 
 
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  
 Research Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
 Chief Executive Officer, Powerlink Queensland.  Views expressed in this article are those of the author, and the 
usual caveats apply. 
1 All results are expressed in Australian Dollars (AUD) unless otherwise signalled.  At the time of writing, AUD$1 = 
USD 0.74, GBP 0.55 and Euro 0.62. 
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From a dynamic efficiency perspective, the market functioned as it should.  At the 
end of the supercycle wholesale electricity prices had fallen from a cyclical peak of 
$103 to $40/MWh2, CO2 emissions had fallen from 171 to 132mtpa and the 20% 
Renewable Target was met.  However, the supercycle produced adverse side-effects 
including ‘system strength’ connection lags, remediation and VRE curtailment, and 
sizeable swings in plant Marginal Loss Factors. 
 
Ongoing VRE plant entry is predictable and necessary given the task of 
decarbonisation.  However, as one of the world’s longest and stringiest transmission 
systems, it is not immediately obvious that the network is capable of hosting a 
dramatic increase in VRE.  This points to necessary increases in the transmission 
network.   
 
One novel policy response has been the concept of developing Renewable Energy 
Zones (REZ) in regional areas of Australia with good wind and solar resources.  
REZ’s are seen as a means by which to develop much needed VRE hosting capacity 
at scale.  Under NEM Rules, (consumer funded) REZ augmentation needs to be 
triggered by either i). a looming reliability constraint, or ii). passing a regulatory cost-
benefit test with a narrow definition of benefit (i.e. resource costs).  Market 
participants seek to move faster than regulatory processes permit, and so alternate 
REZ models seem desirable. 
 
In this article, adverse side-effects from the supercycle are analysed.  The analysis 
suggests NEM locational investment signals are performing as they should, and 
while further reinforcement through locational marginal pricing may sharpen dispatch 
efficiency, it will not increase VRE hosting capacity.  Conversely, adding a REZ will.  
Analysis suggests hosting capacity rather than refining dispatch efficiency is the 
NEMs policy priority.   
 
Welfare implications of REZs are explored through power system modelling.  The 
magnitude of welfare gains from anticipatory transmission planning and a 
transmission network utility guiding the market vis-à-vis VRE entry are evident but 
regulatory solutions lag competitive market outcomes.  The complicating factor of a 
‘market REZ’ is that they are based on Pozo et al.'s (2013) ‘if you build it, they will 
come’ principle3.  To navigate this, a novel and pliable financing structure for a 
market REZ is presented. 
 
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 analyses adverse side-effects arising 
from the VRE investment supercycle.  Section 3 provides a review of relevant 
literature.  Section 4 introduces the modelling framework.  Section 5 presents model 
results.  Section 6 examines both regulatory and market REZs.  Policy implications 
follow. 
 
2. Nature of the problem: side-effects of the supercycle 
NEM policymaker concerns regarding locational signals is best illustrated through an 
applied example, viz. a boilerplate 200MW Solar PV project committed in 2018.  Key 
assumptions are as follows.  Installed capital cost is based on the average of 12 
NEM solar projects committed during 2018/19 at ~$1,390/kW (Simshauser and 
Gilmore, 2020). O&M Costs of $28,000/MW have been drawn from ARENA's (2020) 
recent survey of utility-scale solar plants.  Annual Capacity Factor (ACF) assumed is 
~27.5% (reflective of the Queensland solar fleet). 
 
 
2 Queensland region spot prices for calendar years 2017 and 2020.  
3 A complicating factor in Australia relates to prior episodes of Averch and Johnson (1962) network gold plating and 
sharp increases in network tariffs over the period 2005-2012 (see Mountain and Littlechild, 2010; Nepal, Menezes 
and Jamasb, 2014; Simshauser and Akimov, 2019).  Consumer groups are on heightened alert at the prospect of a 
repeat episode. 
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Project output is sold via a 15-year ‘run-of-plant’ Power Purchase Agreement (BBB  
counterparty) at the levelized cost of entry given expected equity returns of 8% at 
financial close.  Plant forecast Marginal Loss Factor is 0.9900 (i.e. under NEM Rules 
this coefficient represents the plant’s ‘marginal losses’ and is held constant for each 
hour of the year, and is revised annually).   
 
The $278m, 200MW plant is to be project financed with rates and debt sizing 
parameters relevant during 2018 (i.e. Debt Service Coverage Ratio ~1.25x).  The PF 
Model (Appendix I) was used to simultaneously solve the PPA price ($50.9/MWh) 
and debt package ($203m, 73% gearing).  The PPA (line series, RHS) and Annual 
Cash Flows (bar series, LHS) for Years 1-6 are presented in Fig.1. 
 
 200MW Solar PV - PPA Price (line) and expected cash flows (bars) 
 
 
 Problem #1: System strength remediation 
Due to falling system strength in certain network locations, a NEM Rule change 
entered into force during 2018 requiring all new projects to demonstrate ‘no harm’ on 
connection.4 In certain locations, PSCAD modelling revealed inverter-connected VRE 
may amplify voltage oscillations, posing risks to power system security.   
 
In the classic case, modelling results required the 250MW ‘Kiamal’ solar PV plant 
(NEM’s Victorian region) to install a $20m synchronous condenser (SynCon) prior to 
connecting.  This occurred after financial close, which sent a ‘real-time shockwave’ 
through the VRE development and project financing markets5.  This is not an isolated 
example. 
 
 Problem #2: Connection lag 
Following the Kiamal SynCon incident and others like it, an instantaneous change to 
Conditions Precedent for VRE project financings was implemented by risk averse 
project banks – PSCAD modelling needed to be completed prior to financial close.  
Consequently, a new development lag emerged as networks, generators and market 
operators struggled to model impacts. For those projects already committed, lags of 
32-38 weeks emerged as a result (ARENA, 2020; Simshauser and Gilmore, 2020).6   
 
4 s5.3.4B of the Rules required Transmission Networks and the Market Operator to create models of the power 
system, initially to establish available fault levels.  Subsequently, it became clear that interaction amongst 
asynchonous generators (with a special focus on the risk of voltage oscillation) was more important.   
5 Another case, known as the ‘Rhombus of Regret’, lead to five VRE projects in a rhombus shaped area of New 
South Wales & Victoria being constrained to 50% production for 6 months while the risk of voltage oscillations was 
remediated.  There are numerous other applied examples across all NEM regions. 
6 With the benefit of hindsight, network businesses responsible for the system strength modelling weren’t (and under 
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 Problem #3:  Marginal Loss Factor volatility 
Marginal Loss Factors (MLFs) are a critical locational signal in the NEM.  MLFs are 
well understood by incumbent utilities7 and the NEM’s sophisticated VRE developers 
because they act as a spot price ‘multiplier’: 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡 ×  𝑀𝐿𝐹 ×  𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   
 
Consequently, if a plant MLF decreases so do revenues.  It would seem a trap 
emerged for new developers.  Analytically, coal, gas and wind fleet MLFs appeared 
(historically) stable.  But during the supercycle solar PV MLFs deteriorated sharply 
(Fig.2).  Reasons included i). ease of solar entry, ii) synchronised solar output, iii). 
solar projects connecting to weaker parts of the transmission and distribution 
networks (i.e. away from load centres, access to cheap land etc), and iv). lack of 
visibility of simultaneous entry.  The solar fleet-average MLF reduced by 10.5 
percentage points.8 
 





 Problem #4: VRE curtailment 
With the supercycle came 121 new entrants.  Solar quickly overran its own market 
given near perfect correlation of output amongst the fleet, amplified by world-record 
rates of rooftop9 PV installations.  Curtailment would follow and in the NEM, lost 
renewable production is not compensated (which differs from some other jurisdictions 
– see Höfer and Madlener, 2021).  Data from the NEM’s Queensland region for 
2019/20 reveals potential utility-scale solar PV output of 3179GWh (26.4% ACF) from 
the 1372 MW fleet.  Practical output however was 3001GWh (25.0% ACF) meaning 
178GWh (-1.4% ACF) was subject to curtailment.  Of this, 97GWh (-0.8% ACF) was 
 
required.  The only responsible alternative would have been to institute a complete moratorium on VRE entry while 
models were populated.  
7 Most utility generators have at some point experienced a transient MLF shock within their portfolio (i.e. compared to 
year-ahead budgets) due to, for example, changed load flows. 
8 A group of adversely affected VRE project owners proposed a Rule change to alter the NEM’s transmission loss 
framework from marginal to ‘average’ losses.  If the Rule change were to be accepted, it would have successfully 
restored large components of lost VRE project value.  However, it would also defy the laws of physics and economics 
and allocate network losses of c.$400m pa to consumers. Power system dispatch would face a drag on efficiency, 
and the NEM’s historically effective locational signal would be severely impaired.  Unsurprisingly, the Australian 
Energy Market Commission (AEMC) did not find in favour of the proposed Rule change.   
9 For example, in Queensland alone there is more than 3500MW of rooftop solar PV in a system with a maximum 

















 Page 5 
economic curtailment, 54GWh (-0.5% ACF) related to system strength, and 27 GWh 
(-0.2% ACF) due to network congestion.   
 
 Ex post outcomes 
Adverse side-effects were compounding for our boilerplate 200MW solar PV project.  
Recall expected equity returns were 8%.  Fig.3 presents revised project costings (bar 
series, LHS-Axis) after accounting for: 
 
1. installation of a $20m SynCon; 
2. 32-week connection lag;  
3. 10.5 percentage point structural MLF drop;  
4. VRE curtailment of -1.0% ACF.   
 
Year 1 cash flows reduce due to connection lags.  Thereafter, annual costs rise to 
~$30 million per annum, $6m above ex ante (Fig.1) cost expectations.  The revised 
PPA price required to achieve an 8% equity return is $73.4/MWh, ~$23/MWh higher 
(Fig.3, line series, RHS Axis). 
 
 Ex post 100MW Solar ‘required’ project cash flows vs Executed PPA 
 
 
Plant performance given the previously executed PPA at $50.9/MWh, ex post MLF of 
0.8850, and a revised ACF of 26.5% translates to annual revenues of only ~$22m.10  
The running cash yield therefore falls from ~8% to ~1%.  Restoring returns to 8% 
would require an asset write-down of ~$68m (i.e. 70% of the $96m equity cheque).   
 
 Policy implications 
Identifying and quantifying specific sources of investment failure (see Fig.4) is 
important to ensure any policy response is undertaken with ‘surgical precision’ rather 
than create a mass disruption event.  While our 200MW solar example was far more 
than a theoretical one11, ~80% of the 121 VRE projects entered successfully 
notwithstanding universal connection lags (Simshauser and Gilmore, 2020).   
 
Fig.4 identifies the sources of investment failure.  Note network congestion accounts 
for only $0.3 out of $23/MWh and therefore presents as a ‘minority source’.  The 
‘majority sources’ of investment failure are post entry impacts of System Strength 
 
10 The synchronous condenser may generate an additional revenue stream which has not been captured here. 
11 Another example involved international developer John Laing, who wrote down the value of their Australian VRE 
portfolio by £66m primarily due to adverse MLF changes.  See Australian Financial Review 31 March 2020 “Slow 
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connection lag ($11.1/MWh)12, System Strength curtailment and System Strength 
remediation ($0.8 and $3.3/MWh) and post entry changes to MLFs ($6.3/MWh).  
Economic curtailment ($1.0/MWh) requires no policy attention whatsoever.   
 
 200MW Solar PV valuation impacts 
 
 
3. Review of Literature  
With the Section 2 analysis providing necessary background information, strands of 
literature relevant to the subsequent analysis include locational investment signals in 
energy markets, and policy discontinuity in Australia. 
 
3.1 Locational investment signals in energy markets 
The need for locational investment signals in restructured electricity markets is 
axiomatic.  Prior to reforms, integrated resource planning by vertical monopoly 
utilities co-optimised generation resource costs and transmission plant investment 
options for a given load forecast.  Co-optimisation is not possible in restructured 
markets because rival generator investment decisions are driven by forward prices or 
renewable policies, with transmission networks performing a ‘responsive role’ 
(Sauma and Oren, 2006; Torre et al. 2008).  With few exceptions, network upgrades 
or augmentations are reliability-driven considerations in spite of the frequent potential 
for small transmission investments to result in surprisingly large competition benefits 
(Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft, 2000).   
 
Multiple jurisdictions (US, Great Britain, Europe, Australia) are experiencing sharp 
increases in utility-scale VRE.  This is driving demand for costly transmission 
infrastructure, ancillary services, rising network congestion and greater Market 
Operator intervention (Neuhoff et al., 2013; Bird et al., 2016; Neuhoff et al., 2016; 
Bertsch et al., 2017; Joos and Staffell, 2018; Ambrosius et al., 2019; Wagner, 2019; 
Heptonstall and Gross, 2020; Simshauser and Gilmore, 2020; Pollitt and Anaya, 
2021). The coordination of generation and transmission investment is therefore of 
rising interest (van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2012; Munoz et al., 2017; Pechan, 2017; 
AEMC, 2019; Ambrosius et al., 2019; Eicke et al., 2020).   
 
 
12 In theory at least, these lags should now occur prior to financial close.  However, this also means that project 
development (and therefore capital at risk in the pre-closure stages) is dramatically higher as a result, thus raising 
barriers to entry. 
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With VRE expanding across an increasing number of sites, locational signals in 
energy markets is of unquestionable interest to policymakers.  Does this mean zonal 
markets should be discarded in favour of nodal markets?  As with Europe, questions 
of Australia’s zonal power market design and adequacy of locational signals persist 
(AEMC, 2019).13 However, as Section 2 illustrated the nature of the problem vis-à-vis 
rising VRE in Australia is quite different to primary concerns that exist in European 
countries such as Germany14 (as Fig.5 subsequently reveals).   
 
There should be no doubt a nodal market of the type envisaged by Schweppe et al., 
(1988) will outperform a zonal market design from a dispatch efficiency perspective 
(Bjørndal and Jørnsten, 2001; Joskow, 2008; van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2011; 
Neuhoff et al., 2013; Holmberg and Lazarczyk, 2015).  That is, a primary benefit of 
nodal pricing is generally considered to be dispatch efficiency given varying unit fuel 
costs (Green, 2007; Joskow, 2008; Eicke et al., 2020).  Although as one Reviewer 
noted this does hinge on how losses are treated in nodal markets, viz. socialised or 
specified, and when specified, the accuracy of the methodology (see for example 
Litvinov et al., 2004) 
 
However, recall from Section 2 that in the Australian context, dispatch efficiency and 
network congestion was a minority source of investment failure and of the order 
estimated by Green (2007) in relation to Great Britain at the time.  Majority sources 
related to hosting capacity, system strength and the predictability of locational signals 
during an investment supercycle. Whether nodal market signals outperform zonal 
markets vis-à-vis generation investment locational decisions is more nuanced.  There 
is a general lack of evidence that such markets impact the efficiency of future 
network investment, noting congestion rents form a small fraction of required 
transmission augmentation capital costs (Eicke, Khanna and Hirth, 2020).   
 
As Hadush et al. 2011 explain, investment location decisions require signals to be i). 
stable, ii). predictable, and iii). of significant strength (see also Wagner, 2019; Eicke 
et al. 2020). Greater spatial locational signalling must prima facie be helpful, but, 
while zone splitting or nodal markets invariably enhance dispatch efficiency, they do 
not necessarily provide stable, predictable or strong signals as Hadush et al. (2011) 
illustrate.  Further, all markets (including nodal markets) use multiple signalling 
mechanisms and consequently there are multiple pathways to establish or enhance 
locational signals for VRE investment (Eicke et al. 2020).   
 
While establishing a power market with a nodal design is no doubt preferable, 
transitioning a mature power market from zonal to nodal (i.e. in the 2020s) is a very 
different policy decision.  Transaction costs of such a change are often 
underestimated15 or assumed away in market re-design analyses and therefore 
overlook consequences of a potential ‘mass disruption event’16.  Use of additional 
signalling mechanisms, zone splitting, or establishment of Renewable Energy Zones 
 
13 A not insignificant issue with NEM policymaking at the time of writing is, as Kristov et al. (2016, p.63) explain, the 
temptation to jump right in to ‘sexy market design’ and assume mundane operational matters, the laws of physics, 
and transition issues associated with a mass disruption event will sort themselves out.  The most important (i.e. 
immediate) problems facing the NEM include Frequency regulation, voltage oscillations and falling system strength 
associated with inverter-connected plant, and falling inertia as coal plant exit (Simshauser and Gilmore, 2020). 
14 In Germany the problem of network congestion and lost VRE production is amplified by a requirement to allocate 
the (opportunity) cost of VRE curtailment to consumers (Höfer and Madlener, 2021).  In Australia’s NEM, no such 
requirement exists and therefore the consequence of poor locational decisions are, at least in the medium run, borne 
by the VRE investor. 
15 See AEMC (2019) for example.  In a more recent example, the 5 minute settlement rule change was thought to 
involve ‘$10s of millions’ in system costs.  Market participants have already spend over $400m and this excludes the 
costs of the market operator’s system. 
16 Simshauser and Gilmore (2020) highlight if Australia’s NEM was to change from multi-zonal plus MLFs to nodal 
prices, most contracts would break down because MLFs are quite fundamental to wholesale market transactions.  
This would therefore trigger the renegotiation of more than 100 Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) en-masse, and 
adversely impact $19bn of project and corporate finance underpinning Australian generators.  The market operator’s 
initial estimate of system changes was $300m for their own IT network.  
 Page 8 
(particularly if hosting capacity is the problem) may be preferable, or provide an 
interim step.   
 
Zonal markets have the benefit of greater transparency and simplicity (Eicke et al. 
2020), are usually associated with lower market power risk (Bigerna and Bollino, 
2016; Bigerna et al. 2016; Grimm et al., 2016) and centralise market participants and 
therefore forward market liquidity (Simshauser, 2019a).  And as Grimm et al. (2016) 
explain, multi-zonal markets frequently reflect transmission scarcities in a proximate 
way in any event (see also Bjørndal and Jørnsten, 2008).  Ambrosius et al. (2019) 
find the mere threat of market structural changes to zonal markets can be expected 
to drive better locational decisions by new entrant generators.  Above all, and of 
relevance to this article, a change from zones to nodes vis-à-vis spot pricing does not 
deliver additional VRE network hosting capacity in a market with already strong 
locational signals as Eicke et al (2020) illustrate.   
 
Specifically, in their examination of 12 of the world’s major wholesale power markets, 
Eicke et al. (2020) reveal all jurisdictions employ multiple locational mechanisms for 
signalling purposes, and that no dominant combination exists. Locational signalling 
for investment includes spatial granularity (zone splitting, nodal), temporal granularity 
& usage charges (e.g. time varying marginal loss factors), grid connection charges, 
capacity and VRE support mechanisms.  Note from Fig.5 Australia’s NEM transmits 
particularly strong locational signals through moderate spatial granularity (i.e. five 
zones) and acute temporal granularity (i.e. MLFs) across 1000 substations, as either 
bonus or penalty (+/-) through MLF multipliers17 ascribed to each load and each plant 
connection point.   
 
 Highest value differences of locational signals across 12 markets 
 
Source: Eicke et al (2020) 
 
For VRE investment commitment decisions, what matters are ex ante expectations 
and the strength of locational signals rather than ex post actual outcomes, because 
once a locational generation investment decision is made it is irreversible (Hadush et 
al. 2011; Eicke et al. 2020).  Locational signals that are rules-based enhance 
predictability and therefore accuracy of ex ante expectations.  Ex ante signals are 
ideal for investment location decisions, while ex post adjustments optimise dispatch 
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Additionally, as Hadush et al. (2011) explain, the stability, predictability and 
magnitude of locational signals are important variables in guiding location decisions 
of new plant but other factors can dominate investment decisions.  Multiple studies 
show how policies such as ill-designed Contracts-for Differences auctions based on 
levelized costs can dismantle the efficacy of locational marginal prices, adversely 
impact location decisions or distort incentives (Schmidt et al., 2013; Alayo et al. 2017; 
Pechan, 2017; Wagner, 2019).  Pechan (2017) finds fixed price contracts drive VRE 
investment to the best resource sites whereas stronger locational signals and VRE 
plant exposed to spot markets produce spatial diversity because the ‘earned price’ of 
output (or ‘capacity value’ per Peter and Wagner, 2021) is just as important as output 
levels.18  With government-initiated CfD and Feed-in Tariffs, maximising output is the 
only driver (Schmidt et al., 2013).  Irrational exuberance in response to high market 
clearing prices can also dominate otherwise strong locational signals as Simshauser 
& Gilmore (2020) illustrate.19  Consequently, if investment locational signals and 
hosting capacity are the source of the problem to be solved (rather than network 
congestion per se), an anticipatory transmission planner and the establishment of 
REZs may prove a viable policy option.   
 
3.2 Anticipatory transmission planner: ‘guiding the market’ 
The basic setup of deregulated markets usually places transmission networks in a 
responsive role rather than in a position to provide locational guidance (van der 
Weijde and Hobbs, 2011; Wagner, 2019). For most of the past two decades, it could 
be argued that a responsive role for transmission networks was appropriate.  But if 
transmission continuously follows rising numbers of distributed VRE investments in 
deregulated markets, the lack of choice and ongoing policy distortions may amplify ill-
advised plant siting decisions.  And as Alayo et al. (2017) explain, badly sited 
generators induce inefficient levels of congestion and curtailment, and give rise to 
negative externalities in future transmission planning (Schmidt et al., 2013; Bird et al., 
2016; Alayo et al. 2017; Bertsch et al., 2017; Pechan, 2017).  As an absolute general 
conclusion, badly sited generators can be expected to harm economic welfare. 
 
Conversely, numerous studies show a benevolent ‘anticipatory’ transmission planner 
that guides the market regarding future location decisions in light of the sunk network 
can materially enhance welfare (Sauma and Oren, 2006; Tor et al, 2008; van der 
Weijde and Hobbs, 2012; Munoz et al., 2015; Alayo et al., 2017; Munoz et al., 2017; 
Ambrosius et al., 2019; Wagner, 2019).  Solving (real-timeframe) network congestion 
is a different problem to solving (planning-timeframe) investment commitment 
location signals. In practice, there are limited options for dealing with the former, and 
as noted earlier, multiple options for guiding the latter (Hadush et al, 2011).  The 
purpose of this article is to add a new variable to that list, viz. Renewable Energy 
Zones established as either a regulatory asset or market asset – the latter by a risk-
taking transmission network planner seeking to guide the market.   
 
3.3 Policy discontinuity – did NEM locational signals fail? 
Data in Fig.5 suggests the NEM has strong locational signals.  Yet approximately 
20% of projects in the NEM’s supercycle experienced various forms of investment 
failure.  If the problem was not a lack of locational signalling, what was the problem?  
In short, it was a lack of transparency over ‘MLF sensitivities’ during an episode of 
simultaneous entry en masse.  And the root cause of simultaneous entry en masse 
can be traced to what has become known as Australia’s decade-long climate change 
policy war.   
 
Australia’s underlying electricity-related policies and energy-only market design has 
been stable, durable and world class (MacGill, 2010; Simshauser, 2014).  But as 
 
18 Lion Hirth has produced a number of analyses emphasising this point from a plant portfolio perspective (see 
Edenhofer et al., 2013; Hirth, 2013, 2015; Hirth, Ueckerdt and Edenhofer, 2016).  See also (Simshauser, 2018b, 
2019b; Eising, Hobbie and Möst, 2020; Peter and Wagner, 2021). 
19 See in particular Figure 20a and 20b. 
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Fleischman et al., (2013)20 explain, a key dilemma for policymakers has been an 
inability to achieve a united climate change policy architecture given strong political 
differences at the national level (Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).21  Two policy 
mechanisms have been the subject of policy discontinuity, i). Australia’s Renewable 
Energy Target and ii). Emissions Trading (Jones, 2010).22   
 
Australia introduced the world’s first Renewable Portfolio Standard after passing 
legislation in 2000 (Jones, 2010; MacGill, 2010).  An initial obligation of ‘2% by 2010’ 
was placed on electricity retailers and mobilised by tradeable Certificates (Jones, 
2009; Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019). The 2% target was comfortably met four 
years ahead of schedule (Buckman and Diesendorf, 2010) but with Australia’s 
international CO2 obligations known and no further policy developments proposed, 
State Governments began to fill the policy vacuum.  As Jones (2014) and Schelly 
(2014) explain, this also occurred in the US and Canada.23  
 
Australia’s two main political parties committed to more ambitious policies of 15-20% 
on the eve of the 2007 general election.24  A united position also existed on an 
Emissions Trading Scheme (Jones, 2010; Apergis and Lau, 2015; Simshauser, 
2018a).  The social democrats were elected and passed their preferred policy in 
2008, expanding the Renewable Energy Target from 2% to 20%.  The initial design 
was held intact and expressed as a fixed volumetric target of ~44TWh by 2020 (i.e. 
20% of projected 2020 demand, forecast in 2008).    
 
By 2012, NEM aggregate demand was visibly contracting, wholesale prices had 
collapsed but retail-level electricity prices were rising sharply due to surging network 
tariffs and the cost of renewable subsidies, thus creating a political flashpoint (Nelson 
et al, 2012; Nelson et al., 2013; Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2014; Garnaut, 2014; 
Simshauser, 2014; Nelson et al, 2015; Bell et al., 2017).  In response, an 
unscheduled Review25 of the 20% target was initiated by the newly elected 
conservative government in 2013. The unwritten purpose of the Review was to 
reduce the 44TWh target.  Given contracting aggregate demand, the Renewable 
Energy Target was moving closer to 30% cf. the 20% policy design.  In the end, the 
policy was scaled-back to 33TWh (Biggs, 2016) but not before VRE investment flows 
were severely punctured during an elongated period of policy uncertainty 
(Simshauser, 2018a).  
 
Stalled investment from 2012-2016 and a sharply accelerating trajectory, even with 
the lower 33TWh target, left little time for investors to respond to the 2020 policy 
closure date.  Irrational exuberance and the supercycle was the outcome 
(Simshauser & Gilmore, 2020).  Some policymakers had feared NEM locational 
signals were inadequate due to various investment failures.  Far from it, locational 
signals were amplified as Figures 2, 4 and 5 illustrated. 
 
 
20 Fleischman et al., (2013) were examining US circumstances, but their description is equally applicable to Australia. 
21 See also Byrnes et al., (2013); Molyneaux et al., (2013); Nelson et al., (2013); Freebairn (2014); Garnaut (2014); 
Apergis and Lau (2015); Nelson (2015); Simshauser (2018a). 
22 On emissions trading, formal policies had been developed and discarded in 1999-2001, 2005-2006 and in 2007-
2010 (Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).  In late-2010 a minority Labor Government emerged from the 2010 
Commonwealth election, revived an earlier policy that had been discarded only months earlier and legislated a $23/t 
fixed carbon tax from July 2012 as a precursor to an Emissions Trading Scheme (Garnaut, 2014; Wild, Bell and 
Forster, 2015).  The policy was abandoned in 2014 following a change of government.  Three further ETS policy 
attempts occurred in 2016, 2017 and 2018 but were discarded by the right of the conservative Liberal party.  In all, 
from 1999-2018 seven formal attempts at an Emissions Trading Scheme were initiated with no tractable policy 
emerging (Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).  
23 From the early-2000s State Governments began to mandate higher Targets for their own jurisdictions as 
Commonwealth Emissions Trading policy stalled (Nelson et al., 2013; Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2014; Jones, 
2014; Simshauser, 2018a). Work simultaneously commenced on a State-based National Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Nelson et al., 2010; Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).   
24 That is, a 15% Clean Energy Target or a greatly expanded ‘20% Renewable Energy Target by 2020’. 
25 Known as the “Warburton Review”. 
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4. Model 
In order to explore the potential role of REZs, NEMESYS, a partial equilibrium 
(security-constrained unit commitment) model with half-hourly resolution and price 
formation based on a uniform (first-price) auction clearing mechanism, has been 
used.  As with Bushnell (2010), the model assumes perfect competition, free entry 
and exit to install any capacity combination that satisfies differentiable equilibrium 
conditions in a lossless network setup. And as with Hirth (2013), half-hour resolution 
simulation modelling over a reporting year forms the focus of results.  The Model 
logic appears in Appendix II.  
 
Five stylised scenarios are simulated, with each scenario comprising the average of 
50 iterations (i.e. 250 iterations in total) given stochastic generation plant availability 
and load variation.  Figure 6 presents the zonal market setup.  There are two nodes 
comprising load and generation (coal plant at Node A, gas-fired plant at Node B).  A 
possible third node option (Node REZ, dashed line series) also exists with good wind 
and solar resource options.  Node A houses an aging coal plant, while Node B has 
possible CCGT and OCGT plant options (dashed line series). 
 





5. Model Scenarios and Results 
In order to guide the market, an anticipatory transmission planner seeks to establish 
a REZ.  In the model, a Base Case and four stylised variation simulations are tested, 
as follows. 
 
1. The Base Case is per the initial model setup in Fig.6, excluding all investment 
options (indicated by red-dashed lines).  To be clear, aging coal plant ‘3A’ 
remains in-service in the Base Case. 
 
2. In the Regulated REZ scenario, a transmission network utility plans to add a 
‘Regulated REZ’ with capital cost (𝐾𝑡𝑗) $225m, transfer capacity (𝑓) of 
1500MW and new generation comprising 1388MW of wind, and 825MW of 
solar PV.  Base+REZ results outlined in Section 5.1 demonstrate the REZ will 
not prima facie pass the NEM’s regulatory test (and primarily because of the 
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3. Next, in the Coal Exit scenario, the ‘sudden exit’ of the aging coal plant ‘3A’ 
(2 x 400MW) located at Node A is simulated – reflecting the NEM’s recent 
historical experiences in the regions of South Australia (2016) and Victoria 
(2017).  Results demonstrate severe adverse welfare implications of 
disorderly exit including violation of the reliability constraint.  To restore power 
system reliability, two alternate scenarios are simulated: 
 
4. The Exit+Gas scenario involves plant replacement by way of gas-fired 
generation at Node B, 500MW CCGT (Gen3B) and 300MW OCGT (Gen4B). 
 
5. The Exit+REZ scenario involves replacement by way of the $225m REZ with 
line transfer capacity of 1500MW and ~2200MW of VRE.   
 
5.1 Model Results for Scenario 1: Base Case vs Regulated REZ 
Table 1 presents model results for the Base Case and Regulated REZ (‘Reg. REZ’) 
simulations.  In the Base Case, the fleet of coal and gas generators produce 
30,316GWh (average of 50 iterations reported) with market shares of 75% and 25%, 
respectively.  Transfer capacity of 1400MW between Nodes A-B operates 
unconstrained, market prices clear at $57.7/MWh and Unserved Energy is 
comfortably within the reliability standard (at 0.0011%).  Resource costs are $986m 
and total costs (i.e. including incumbent fixed and sunk costs) amount to $1795m – 
slightly above market turnover of $1744m meaning that the generation fleet largely 
recovers all fixed and sunk costs.26   
 
 
26 There is a shortfall of ~$1.7/MWh, noting breakeven produces equity returns of ~8-10%.   
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Table 1:   Scenario 1 – Base Case vs the Regulated REZ 
 
 
In Regulated REZ simulation (2nd results column, Tab.1), REZ augmentation with 
new entrant wind (1388MW) and solar (895MW) capacity delivers 7392GWh of VRE 
generation (24% market share) with annualised Transmission and VRE capital costs 
of $16m and $304m respectively.  Gas-fired generation reduces by almost half and 
coal output reduces by 3107GWh (14%).  The REZ produces a merit order effect, 
with prices reducing from $57.7/MWh to $40.2/MWh.  Given own price elasticity of   
-0.10, energy demand rises to 31,133GWh.  There is a modest level of congestion 
on transmission line TREZ (266 hours, and ~32GWh of constrained VRE Production) 
although to be clear VRE generators operate at very close to full potential output (i.e. 
unconstrained through to the 97th percentile of potential output).  Transmission line 
Base Reg. REZ Chg
Plant Capacity
Coal (Node A) (MW) 2,800 2,800 0
Gas (Node B) (MW) 3,150 3,150 0
Wind (REZ) (MW) 0 1,389 1,389
Solar (REZ) (MW) 0 895 895
Total (MW) 5,950 8,234 2,284
Plant Output
Coal (GWh) 22,793 19,685 -3,107
Gas (GWh) 7,420 4,056 -3,364
Wind (GWh) 0 5,174 5,174
Solar (GWh) 0 2,218 2,218
Total Generation (GWh) 30,213 31,133 921
Market Statistics
Maximum Demand (MW) 5,004 5,151 147
Energy Demand (GWh) 30,213 31,101 888
Unserved Energy (%) 0.0011% 0.0000% -0.0011%
Constrained VRE (GWh) n/a 32 32
TREZ Constraints (hrs) n/a 266 266
TAB Constraints (hrs) 0 1,389 1,389
Carbon Emissions (Mt) 23.8 19.4 -4.4
Spot Price ($/MWh) 57.7 40.2 -17.5
Market Turnover ($m) 1,744 1,252 -493
Resource Costs
Coal ($m) 613 527 -87
Gas ($m) 373 192 -181
REZ Trans. (Tj) ($m) 0 16 16
Wind/Solar/OCGT (Gn) ($m) 0 304 304
Resource Costs ($m) 986 1,038 52
Fixed & Sunk Costs ($m) 809 809 0
Total Economic Costs ($m) 1,795 1,847 52
Producer Surplus ($m) 758 214 -545
Economic Profits ($m) -51 -595 -545
Economic Profit ($/MWh) -1.7 -19.1 -17.4
Chg in Resource Cost ($m) n/a -52 loss
Chg Producer Surplus ($m) n/a -545 loss
Chg Consumer Surplus ($m) n/a 468 gain
Welfare Gain / Loss ($m) n/a -76 loss
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TAB is congested for 1389 hours, with marginal coal plant output being adversely 
impacted27. 
 
The most important result from Table 1 is however resource costs, which rise to 
$1038m (up $52m) meaning REZ transmission augmentation would not prima facie 
meet the NEM regulatory test.28  Although lower prices produce a material gain in 
consumer welfare (+$468m), an equally significant wealth transfer occurs with 
producer surplus falling by $545m. Economic losses incurred by the generation fleet 
total $591m.   
 
Note however that CO2 emissions are not priced in NEM regulatory tests.  Note in 
Tab.1 that CO2 emissions reduce by 4.4mtpa, and if these were priced at $17.5/t, in 
theory the regulatory test result.  However, recall from Section 3.3 that Australia’s 
NEM lacks a united climate change policy architecture due to strong political 
differences at the national level.    
 
5.2 Model Results for Scenario 2: Coal exit: Gas vs REZ 
Given the intractability of the Regulated REZ in Section 5.1, it is worth exploring the 
conditions under which a Regulated REZ would pass the cost-benefit test, i.e. a 
response to a looming reliability constraint.  Table 2 presents results for a ‘Coal Exit’ 
scenario (LHS column) and two response scenarios (RHS columns), specifically, i). 
Exit+Gas with gas generation at Node B, and ii) Exit+REZ.   
 
The first point to note in relation to the Coal Exit case is that the reliability constraint 
is violated (LHS column, red shaded cell, Tab.2) with Unserved Energy averaging 
0.0175% (~90 half-hour trading intervals per annum).  Consequently, this scenario is 
intractable and no further discussion is warranted.  A supply-side response is 
absolutely necessary, and two credible alternatives are presented in the RHS 
columns of Tab.2. 
 
The first response labelled ‘Exit+Gas’ comprises 800MW of new gas-fired generation 
with annualised capital costs of ~$119m (nb included in Gas resource costs of 
$673m).  Coal output contracts to 55% market share with gas producing the 
remaining 45%.  Transfer capacity between Nodes A-B operates unconstrained, 
market prices clear at $65.1/MWh and Unserved Energy falls back to within the 
reliability standard.   
 
Resource costs are $1228m and total costs amount to $1922m – slightly above 
market turnover of $1947m with the generation fleet earning economic profits of 
$25m (or $0.8/MWh).  A difficulty with this scenario, however, is that it is unlikely to 
represent a stable equilibrium because as the next scenario illustrates, VRE has 
lower entry costs (nb. and earned prices) than the $65.1/MWh clearing price. 
 
The second response labelled ‘Exit+REZ’ adds the REZ and VRE fleet.  Aggregate 
demand expands to 30,357GWh with coal, gas and VRE market shares being 53%, 
23% and 25%, respectively.  Unsurprisingly, CO2 emissions are lowest at 17.4mtpa, 
down 27% on the Table 1 Base Case.   There is a modest level of congestion on 
transmission line TREZ (266 hours, and ~32GWh of constrained VRE Production) 
while transmission line TAB is congested for 101 hours29. 
 
Wholesale prices in the Exit+REZ simulation clear at $56/MWh, $9/MWh lower than 
the Exit+Gas scenario.  Note merit order effects observed in Table 1 (i.e. Regulated 
REZ simulation) unwind due to coal plant exit.  Resource Costs of $1097m (including 
 
27 If the market was operated on a nodal basis, spot prices at Node A would clear at -$2.7/MWh below Node B 
holding all else constant. 
28 After accounting for the expansion in output, the differential is actually closer to -$20m. 
29 If the market was operated on a nodal basis, spot prices at Node A and Node REZ would clear -$0.2/MWh below 
Node B, holding all else constant. 
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annualised REZ and VRE capital costs of $16m and $304m) are $131m lower than 
the Exit+Gas simulation.  Producer Surplus falls by $115m while Consumer Surplus 
rises by $229m, with total welfare increased by $114m per annum.  Once again, CO2 
emissions have not been valued due to their current exclusion from the cost-benefit 
test. 
 
Table 2:   Scenario 2 – Coal exit, gas & REZ 
 
 
5.3 Summary of Results 
To summarise the results, the Base Case comprised a fleet of coal and gas-fired 
generation plant.  A ‘Regulated REZ’ could not be justified and the results in Table 1 
were clear on this because in the NEM a narrow definition of benefits is used in 
regulatory cost-benefit analyses (i.e. typically limited to resource costs).  If CO2 
emissions were included in the analysis at $17.5/t, the result would theoretically 
reverse (albeit noting highly stylised assumptions used).   
 
The analysis and results presented in Table 2 illustrated that, in a practical sense, a 
Regulated REZ will be limited to reliability-driven augmentations, just as Borenstein, 
Bushnell and Stoft (2000) explain more generally. The Table 2 results showed that 
absent supply-side augmentation, the exit of a 2 x 400MW coal plant in Zone A would 
lead to wholesale prices surging to politically unacceptable levels of $119/MWh, and 
Coal Exit Exit+Gas Exit+REZ Chg
Plant Capacity
2,000 Coal (Node A) (MW) 2,000 2,000 0
3,150 Gas (Node B) (MW) 3,950 3,150 -800
0 Wind (REZ) (MW) 0 1,389 1,389
0 Solar (REZ) (MW) 0 895 895
5,150 Total (MW) 5,950 7,434 1,484
Plant Output
16,441 Coal (GWh) 16,469 15,924 -544
10,833 Gas (GWh) 13,465 7,041 -6,425
0 Wind (GWh) 0 5,156 5,156
0 Solar (GWh) 0 2,204 2,204
27,274 Total Generation (GWh) 29,934 30,324 390
Market Statistics
4,518 Maximum Demand (MW) 4,958 5,028 70
27,280 Energy Demand (GWh) 29,934 30,357 423
0.0175% Unserved Energy (%) 0.0006% 0.0010% 0.0004%
Constrained VRE (GWh) n/a 32 32
n/a TREZ Constraints (hrs) n/a 266 266
0 TAB Constraints (hrs) 0 101 101
19.9 Carbon Emissions (Mt) 20.7 17.4 -3.3
119.0       Spot Price ($/MWh) 65.1 56.0 9.0-              
3,444 Market Turnover ($m) 1,947 1,701 -247
Resource Costs
436 Coal ($m) 436 421 -15
581 Gas ($m) 673 356 -317
0 REZ Trans. (Tj) ($m) 0 16 16
0 Wind/Solar/OCGT (Gn) ($m) 119 304 185
1,017 Resource Costs ($m) 1,228 1,097 -131
663 Fixed & Sunk Costs ($m) 694 663 -31
1,680 Total Economic Costs ($m) 1,922 1,760 -162
2,428 Producer Surplus ($m) 719 604 -115
1,765 Economic Profit ($m) 25 -59 -84
65 Economic Profit ($/MWh) 0.8 -1.9 -2.8
-25 Chg in Resource Cost ($m) n/a 131 gain
1,670 Chg Producer Surplus ($m) n/a -115 loss
-1,607 Chg Consumer Surplus ($m) n/a 229 gain
n/a Welfare Gain / Loss ($m) n/a 114 gain
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the reliability constraint would be violated.  The default scenario of gas generation 
replacement at Node B provided a benchmark solution for which the Regulated REZ 
and 2284MW of VRE plant was compared.  Only at this point was the Regulated REZ 
able to maximise welfare (and did so regardless of whether CO2 emissions were 
included given assumed spot gas and VRE prices).  
 
Does this mean that REZs can only be built in response to scheduled coal plant 
retirements?  In a regulatory sense, the answer is currently yes and the NEM’s 
Integrated System Plan broadly follows this logic.  Prima facie, this does appear to 
present a material problem for a power system that needs to be decarbonised. 
 
However in a practical sense, ongoing VRE investments are predictable.  Unlike the 
regulatory test, certain consumer segments (particularly large corporates) value 
variables beyond the regulatory test and are seeking to underwrite new entrant VRE 
plant to acquit their own ‘Scope 2’ or electricity-related CO2 emissions objectives.  
Moreover, deterministic scenarios fail to capture sudden coal plant exit (which in the 
NEM have been ‘un-forecasted and sudden’) and the practical evidence is that 
jurisdictional Governments are increasingly seeking to ‘defuse’ reliability risk through 
pre-emptive policy.  Furthermore, these same State Governments (i.e. Victoria, New 
South Wales, Queensland) are increasingly including CO2 emissions objectives in 
their policies, and are increasingly ‘side-stepping’ imperfect regulation through policy 
or side-payments to augment transmission capacity. Ultimately if market demand for 
VRE plant exceeds supply and regulatory processes constrain transmission, we 
should anticipate market-based REZ’s.     
 
6. Renewable Energy Zones: regulated and market 
Munoz et al. (2017) explain the usual assumption of the ‘risk neutral transmission 
planner’ is frequently erroneous due to parametric uncertainty vis-à-vis aggregate 
demand, VRE generation, construction costs, policy, long lead times and irreversible 
investments.  Evidence (including from the NEM) suggests most transmission 
planners are not risk neutral, but are in fact highly risk averse.   
 
The following analysis assumes a (bounded30) risk seeking transmission planner 
under uncertainty which guides locational decisions with an objective function of 
maximising welfare.  REZ modelling and model inputs in Section 5 were based off 
worked examples from the NEM’s Queensland region, viz. a $225m double circuit 
275kV line splitting into two radial sections of single circuit 275kV to known VRE 
resource areas.  Synchronous Condensers would be pre-supplied to ensure 
adequate system strength exists to form credible hosting capacity of ~1500MW 
(thermal) at a pro-rata capital cost of $150/kW.31  Realistically, a REZ of this nature 
could be phased to minimise the cost of carrying idle capacity, but to simplify the 
subsequent analyses, the capital program is assumed to be ‘built overnight’. 
 
6.1 Regulated REZ (benchmark) 
Given a $225m capital investment, ongoing O&M and re-investment costs at ~2% 
per annum and the current Weighted Average Cost of Capital applied to regulated 
network monopolies of ~4.8%, a regulated solution would enter into service with end-
use consumers paying $15.3m per annum, structured per Table 3 with the trajectory 
set out in Figure 7: 
 
 
30 Risk appetite is bounded by the fact that NEM transmission networks typically have a capital stock of ~$8-10 
billion, and the value at risk in the following exercise represents a small fraction of this. 
31 Template double and single circuit 275kV costs are ~$1.4m and $1.0m per km, $60m for synchronous condensers 
and in aggregate approximately $110m for multiple substations (with $90m of this directly partitioned to VRE 
developments).    
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Table 3:   Regulatory Benchmark32 
 
 




6.2 Market REZ 
If a welfare enhancing REZ suffers from imperfect regulation or regulatory lag relative 
to market demand, logical counterparties to originate such infrastructure on a 
merchant basis are capital markets, transmission networks, VRE developers and 
their PPA counterparties.  A market REZ would not enjoy a guaranteed regulated 
revenue stream. Development risks and costs are not allocated or underwritten by 
captive franchise network end-use consumers.  But neither should the timing, sizing, 
cost, equity returns or quality of the market REZ investment constrained by 
regulatory processes.  Instead regulation of a market REZ is applied by market 
forces because if VRE hosting capacity is over-sized, built too early or too capital-
intensive (i.e. with connection charges above efficient levels) the risk of transient or 
permanent under-utilisation of the market REZ would be housed by the sponsoring 
transmission network.  Conversely, for transmission networks the upside is that a 
well-crafted market REZ will eventually become a fully-contracted asset with risk-
adjusted returns cf. regulated rates.   
 
Most Australian transmission networks have sizable portfolios of non-regulated single 
customer ‘Dedicated (shallow) Connection Assets’, jointly developed with connecting 
VRE generators.  The key issues for a market REZ are sizing, coordination of 
multiple counterparties, and (risk-adjusted) expected returns.33  For VRE developers, 
 
32 Note ‘Regulatory Depreciation’ for the purposes of deriving Regulated Revenues is equal to Straight Line 
Depreciation ($5.6m) less RAB Indexation ($4.5m).  The detail of the Regulatory Model used to produce these results 
is set out in detail in Simshauser and Akimov (2019) and so is not reproduced here.  
33 Some regulated network businesses will have constrained or no risk appetite for an (initially) under-contracted 
asset.  Institutional and individual investors in regulated network monopolies are generally seeking exposure to a risk 
averse, asset class with a stable running yield.  Maintenance of this dividend clientele effect is important. 
Consequently, strict and bounded exposure limits will exist vis-à-vis how much ‘uncontracted’ capacity any individual 
 
Total Revenue 15.3         
Comprising
Operating Expenditure 3.4           
Regulatory Deprec. 1.1           
Return on Capital 10.8         
Taxation 0.1           
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the attraction to a REZ is the prospect of defusing the ‘majority sources’ of 
investment failure outlined in Section 2 and Figure 4.   
 
To illustrate the financing of a market REZ, the following simplifying assumptions 
have been used: 
 
• $225m REZ comprises 1500MW of radial property rights; 
• Property rights are sold on a uniform price basis in 250MW tick sizes to wind 
projects; 
• Sale of the first property right originates investment; and 
• Subscription of the remaining 5 x 250MW property rights are randomly 
distributed over a ~7 year window. 
 
In practice, property rights would be divisible and priced according to resources used.  
Holders would be free to optimise holdings by, for example, on-selling some 
component to a solar or battery developer.  The key matter is proportionate use of 
REZ radial capacity and incremental capacity use via trade in property rights.   
 
Figure 8 presents a simulated or example of the ramp-up in property right 
subscriptions (thin line series, RHS Axis) along with market REZ ‘cost element’ cash 
flows (bar series, LHS Axis).  For comparative purposes, the regulated REZ annual 
cash flows are also included as the bold line series (LHS Axis).  The key difference 
between the regulated and market REZ cash flows relates to the source, timing and 
magnitude of revenues.   
 
• The source of revenues for the regulated REZ is end-use consumers.  By 
comparison, the market REZ is funded by connecting VRE generators; 
 
• The timing and magnitude of regulated REZ revenues commence from day 
one with certainty.  By comparison, market REZ revenues (beyond the initial 
or ‘foundation’ generator subscription) is uncertain by both timing and 
magnitude. 
 
Note in the Figure 8 worked example the market REZ is characterised by material 
revenue underperformance in Years 1-3 (cf. Regulatory Benchmark). Negative equity 
returns occur in Years 1-2, and positive but suboptimal returns in Years 3-6.  
However once fully subscribed, the market REZ meets investor expectations with the 
expected equity returns set closer to that of a merchant but contracted VRE 
generator at 7-8%.  Over a 40-year asset life, the Present Value of revenues from the 
regulated and market REZ are virtually identical when both streams are discounted at 




transmission network business can reasonably tolerate.  In this example, the REZ is intended to be small relative to 
the total asset base (eg. 2-3%).  The key issue will be the scale of a single REZ investment.  As the size of the 
proposed asset rises, the more complex the task becomes.     
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Central to the market REZ is the critical role that a structured, Super-sized 
Concessional Mezzanine debt facility plays.  In finance, as the name suggests 
mezzanine or ‘mezz’ is a subordinated debt facility which when deployed typically 
forms a small (i.e. 10-15%) component of the overall capital structure.  From a 
security perspective, it lies between senior debt and shareholder equity (i.e. 
Mezzanine level).  Mezz usually fills any senior debt-raising underperformance34, and 
because it ranks behind senior facilities pricing is typically characterised by a healthy 
premium. 
 
In the current environment, super-sized ‘concessional’ mezz with a pliable coupon 
(guaranteed on exit) is both possible and a policy imperative given the challenges of 
the energy transition.35  Being super-sized and concessional, such a facility would 
have the complete opposite characteristics of conventional mezz.36  And to be clear, 
without a super-sized concessional mezz (i.e. ‘Super Mezz’) facility, a market REZ 
may prove too risky for transmission networks.  But, capital market conditions, 
institutional capacity and policy settings are currently (i.e. in the early-2020s) ideal.  
 
The market REZ capital structure including Super Mezz which underpinned the Fig.8 
results is presented in Fig.9.  To summarise the financing briefly, Super Mezz forms 
60% of the capital structure during Years 1-10.  The remaining capital structure 
comprises senior debt and equity at usual network benchmark ratios (viz. 60% debt, 
40% equity).  In practical terms, this means that the $225m REZ is funded via the 
Super Mezz $135m (60% of REZ), senior debt of $54m (i.e. 60% of the remaining 




34 In practice, mezz most commonly reflects the difference between the credible maximum plausible senior secured 
debt achievable, and the actual level of senior secured debt raised.   
35 Australia has at least two agencies/institutions capable of providing such facilities. 
36 Orchestration may require a three-party covenant financing between the transmission network REZ sponsor, 
jurisdictional government seeking to expand VRE hosting capacity and the capital markets (see Rosenberg et al., 
























Debt Repayments Senior Debt Interest
Mezz Coupon Capex
Opex Regulatory Benchmark
Capacity Rights Sold (RHS)
TNSP
Earnings at Risk
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Note in Fig.9 the first layer of capital (Years 1-7) is a senior secured debt facility.  The 
senior debt facility is initially structured as a Bullet37 (i.e. Term Loan B) with a BBB 
coupon rate of 2.58%.  The second layer of capital is the Super Mezz with a 
guaranteed pliable ‘lookback exit coupon rate’ of 2%.  It is modelled at the pro-rata 
subscription rate of ~2.8%.  At Year 10, the Super Mezz is taken out with a lookback 
settlement such that it satisfies its ex ante aggregate coupon rate of 2% pa.   
 
The third layer of capital is transmission equity, which in this instance is set to a 
7.75% expected (risk-adjusted) return.  The final component of the capital structure is 
a semi-permanent Amortising facility (Term Loan A) which is partially drawn at the 
end of Year 7 (when Term Loan B is taken out) and fully drawn at the end of Year 10 
(when Super Mezz is taken out), and drawn at 3.0%.  
 
The nature of the Super Mezz facility means coupon payments largely match REZ 
asset utilisation according to MW subscription (i.e. actual REZ revenue-earning).  But 
Super Mezz must ultimately be ‘squared away’ at the ex ante coupon rate by Year 
10.  This pliable facility provides necessary breathing space to the ‘risk-seeking’ 
transmission network REZ sponsor, and the overall structure provides critical benefits 
to connecting generators such that they only ever pay their pro-rata subscription. In 
the event, the transmission network has an acute (and aligned) incentive regarding 
the majority sources of investment failure, those associated with connection lags and 
system strength. The faster generators successfully connect to the market REZ, the 
lower the economic consequence of REZ under-utilisation.  And conversely, entry 
lags or disruption will surely harm the reputation of an under-utilised REZ. 
 
6.3 REZ cost and risk impacts on subscribing generators 
In the Section 6.2 worked example, pro-rata annual (shallow REZ connection) 
charges equated to ~$2.5m per annum for each 250MW subscription.  Fig.10 
illustrates results from the PF Model (Appendix I) on how subscription alters the entry 
economics of a 250MW wind project with an assumed capital cost of $2049/kW (i.e. 
the average capital cost of the NEM’s 2020 wind project fleet), fixed and variable 
O&M of $5m and $5/MWh respectively, equity IRR of 8% and a contemporary project 
financing with a run-of-plant fixed price Power Purchase Agreement (BBB rated 
counterparty).   
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The bar series (LHS Axis) in Fig.10 presents the wind farm cost stack ($ ‘000) for 
annual plant capacity factors ranging from 34-41%, while the line series (RHS Axis) 
show the pre- and post-REZ PPA price required to meet debt sizing and equity return 
parameters.  Note that the REZ subscription adds ~$3.2/MWh to plant costs as 
compared to a project cutting in to an existing 275kV line at a location with 0km of 
direct connection infrastructure.   
 




On one hand, $3.2/MWh is not insignificant.  If the generator was unable to be pass 
these costs on to consumers, the running yield of the wind project would reduce from 
8% to 6.4%.  But by comparison to the $20+/MWh risk and a collapse in the 
distribution yield illustrated in Fig.5, $3.2/MWh pales into insignificance.  
Furthermore, given existing network hosting capacity is a rapidly diminishing 
resource, such costs will increasingly form part of common entry costs unless 
regulated REZs are somehow accelerated.  Model results from Section 5 suggest 
this is unlikely to match preferences of certain consumer segments and the NEMs 
principle jurisdictional governments of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland.  
 
6.4 REZ investment risks for the anticipatory transmission planner 
The primary risk of a market REZ for a transmission network is structural under-
subscription.  In the $225m example, if the 1500MW hosting capacity remained 
undersubscribed by (say) 250MW on a permanent basis (see Fig.11), the running 
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 Undersubscribed market based REZ 
 
 
7. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks 
Australia’s NEM experienced a VRE investment supercycle from 2016-2020, 
comprising 13,000MW of new plant commitments.  A number of projects 
subsequently experienced significant entry frictions.  The NEM’s multi-zonal market 
design and strength of locational investment signals have been queried by 
policymakers.  Yet an examination of the ‘majority sources of investment failure’ 
found post-commitment system strength connection lags, system strength 
remediation, system strength-related curtailment, and movements in MLFs to be 
primarily responsible.  NEM locational signals were found to be among the strongest 
of 12 of the world’s major wholesale markets, through zonal price differences and 
MLFs.  Real-time dispatch constraints arising from network congestion were found to 
be a minority source of investment failure.  Network congestion may be acute in 
select areas of the NEM (e.g. North West Victoria) yet these have been driven by 
policy, new plant underpinned by government-sponsored CfDs.  As Section 3 
explained, these are amongst the known causes of poor siting decisions.  
 
To summarise, the common thread amongst the majority sources of investment 
failure was NEM hosting capacity – perhaps unsurprising given the NEM’s 
transmission network is amongst the longest and stringiest in the world.  One novel 
policy solution currently being explored by NEM policymakers is expanding network 
hosting capacity by way of special Renewable Energy Zones.  But the NEM’s 
regulatory framework typically adopts a narrow view of benefit (e.g. resource costs) 
when assessing augmentations.  Consequently, the ‘regulatory triggering’ of a REZ is 
likely to be limited to forecast reliability shortages.  VRE developers, customer 
preferences and jurisdictional governments – driven by environmental considerations 
vis-à-vis decarbonisation – demand faster action.  As is commonly said amongst 
NEM participants, ‘there’s no transition without transmission’. 
 
Prima face, this tends to suggest policymaking associated with transmission 
regulatory benefits needs revision.  The NEM’s principal State Governments 
(Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland) have recently devised their own REZ 
policies which side-step imperfect regulation and regulatory lag.  NEM Rules largely 
accommodate the possibility of a market REZ (albeit with minor modifications 
possibly required) and this may be preferable in the first instance due to the superior 
allocation of risk. 
 
Analysis in this article therefore turned to the prospect of market REZs developed by 
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market REZ over regulatory solutions included speed of adjustment (given regulatory 
lag), and a superior allocation of investment risk (to proponents rather than franchise 
end-use consumers).  A market REZ developed under uncertainty was underpinned 
by the sale of radial property rights, allocated on a subscription basis at planning 
timeframes in an otherwise open access regime.   
 
Central to the market REZ was the nature, source and structure of capital deployed.  
Super Mezz, an oversized concessional mezzanine debt facility was demonstrated to 
provide the market REZ with a pliable and low-cost funding source.  The pliable 
coupon rate delivered necessary ‘financial breathing space’ required by a (bounded) 
risk seeking, anticipatory transmission planner.   
 
Regulatory processes run at half the pace of merchant markets.  Regulated 
augmentations are dominated by reliability-driven investments.  Consequently, 
relying on a centrally planned REZ may stifle opportunity through regulatory lag, and 
plausibly do more harm than good if they have the effect of delaying proceedings 
relative to the decarbonisation objectives of Australia’s jurisdictional governments, 
the ‘ESG38’ appetite and imperatives of Australian corporates and VRE developers. 
 
With jurisdictional renewable targets of 50% by 2030 and an existing renewable 
market share of ~20%, a sophisticated, risk-seeking anticipatory transmission 
planner should expect good returns given their understanding of local network 
capacity and their unique line-of-sight over the universe of VRE development 
proposals (i.e. the first meeting a VRE developer typically organises for a new project 
is with the transmission network regarding grid connection).  Conversely, the same 
anticipatory transmission planner may find their risk appetite wanning when 
renewable market share approaches 50% in the absence of more ambitious targets, 
in which case refining regulatory frameworks may become important. 
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APPENDIX I – PF Model Overview 
 
In the PF Model, costs increase annually by a forecast general inflation rate (CPI).  
Prices escalate at a discount to CPI.  Inflation rates for revenue streams 𝜋𝑗
𝑅 and cost 
streams 𝜋𝑗
𝐶 in period (year) j are calculated as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑗
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,                   (A.1)      
 
The discounted value for 𝛼𝑅 reflects single factor learning rates that characterise 
generating technologies.   
 
Energy output 𝑞𝑗
𝑖  from each plant (i) in each period (j) is a key variable in driving 
revenue streams, unit fuel costs and variable Operations & Maintenance costs.  
Energy output is calculated by reference to installed capacity 𝑘𝑖, capacity utilisation 
rate 𝐶𝐹𝑗
𝑖 for each period j.  Plant auxillary losses 𝐴𝑢𝑥𝑖 arising from on-site electrical 
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A convergent electricity price for the ith plant (𝑝𝑖𝜀) is calculated in year one and 
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In order to define marginal running costs, the thermal efficiency for each generation 
technology 𝑖 needs to be defined.  The constant term ‘3600’39 is divided by 𝑖 to 
convert the efficiency result from % to kJ/kWh.  This is then multiplied by raw fuel 
commodity cost 𝑓𝑖.  Variable Operations & Maintenance costs 𝑣𝑖, where relevant, are 
added which produces a pre-carbon short run marginal cost.  Under conditions of 
externality pricing 𝐶𝑃𝑗, the CO2 intensity of output needs to be defined.  Plant carbon 
intensity 𝑔𝑖 is derived by multiplying the plant heat rate by combustion emissions ?̇?𝑖 
and fugitive CO2 emissions 𝑔𝑖.  Marginal running costs in the j
th period is then 
calculated by the product of short run marginal production costs by generation output 
𝑞𝑗









. 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) + (𝑔𝑖. 𝐶𝑃𝑗)] . 𝑞𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗





},       (A.4) 
 
Fixed Operations & Maintenance costs 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 of the plant are measured in 
$/MW/year of installed capacity 𝐹𝐶𝑖 and are multiplied by plant capacity 𝑘𝑖 and 
escalated.   
 
𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐹𝐶𝑖 . 𝑘𝑖. 𝜋𝑗
𝐶 ,                                   (A.5)
   
  
Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) in the jth 






𝑖),                             (A.6) 
    
 
39 The derivation of the constant term 3600 is: 1 Watt = 1 Joule per second and hence 1 Watt Hour = 3600 Joules. 
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Capital Costs (𝑋0
𝑖) for each plant i are Overnight Capital Costs and incurred in year 0.  
Ongoing capital spending (𝑥𝑗
𝑖) for each period j is determined as the inflated annual 





𝐶 ,                                       (A.7) 
 
Plant capital costs 𝑋0
𝑖  give rise to tax depreciation (𝑑𝑗
𝑖) such that if the current period 
was greater than the plant life under taxation law (L), then the value is 0.  In addition, 
𝑥𝑗











),                                 (A.8) 
 
From here, taxation payable (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) at the corporate taxation rate (𝜏𝑐) is applied to 
 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖  less Interest on Loans (𝐼𝑗
𝑖) later defined in (16), less 𝑑𝑗
𝑖.  To the extent (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) 
results in non-positive outcome, tax losses (𝐿𝑗








𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐),                     (A.9) 
 
𝐿𝑗




𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐),                    (A.10) 
 
The debt financing model computes interest and principal repayments on different 
debt facilities depending on the type, structure and tenor of tranches.  There are two 
types of debt facilities – (a) corporate facilities (i.e. balance-sheet financings) and (2) 
project financings.  Debt structures include semi-permanent amortising facilities and 
bullet facilities.   
 
Corporate Finance typically involves 5- and 7-year bond issues with an implied ‘BBB’ 
credit rating.  Project Finance may include a 5-7 year Bullet facility requiring interest-
only payments after which it is refinanced with consecutive amortising facilities and 
fully amortised over an 18-25 year period (depending on the technology) and a 
second facility commencing with tenors of 5-12 years as an Amortising facility set 
within a semi-permanent structure with a nominal repayment term of 18-25 years.  
The decision tree for the two tranches of debt was the same, so for the Debt Tranche 









𝑖 . 𝑆                  
                            (A.11) 
 
𝐷0
𝑖  refers to the total amount of debt used in the project.  The split (S) of the debt 
between each facility refers to the manner in which debt is apportioned to each 
tranche.  In most model cases, 35% of debt is assigned to Tranche 1 and the 
remainder to Tranche 2.  Principal 𝑃𝑗−1
𝑖  refers to the amount of principal repayment 
















),                          (A.12) 
 
In (12), 𝑅𝑇𝑗 is the relevant interest rate swap (5yr, 7yr or 12yr) and 𝐶𝑇𝑗 is the credit 
spread or margin relevant to the issued Debt Tranche.  The relevant interest payment 
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in the jth period (𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is calculated as the product of the (fixed) interest rate on the loan 






𝑧 ),                                (A.13) 
 
Total Debt outstanding 𝐷𝑗
𝑖, total Interest 𝐼𝑗
𝑖  and total Principle 𝑃𝑗
𝑖 for the ith plant is 
calculated as the sum of the above components for the two debt tranches in time j.  
For clarity, Loan Drawings are equal to 𝐷0
𝑖  in year 1 as part of the initial financing and 
are otherwise 0.   
 
One of the key calculations is the initial derivation of 𝐷0
𝑖  (as per eq.11).  This is 
determined by the product of the gearing level and the Overnight Capital Cost (𝑋0
𝑖).  
Gearing levels are formed by applying a cash flow constraint based on credit metrics 
applied by project banks and capital markets.  The variable 𝛾 in our PF Model relates 
specifically to the legal structure of the business and the credible capital structure 
achievable.  The two relevant legal structures are Vertically Integrated (VI) merchant 
utilities (issuing ‘BBB’ rated bonds) and Independent Power Producers using Project 






































𝑖   ,
  (A.14)
     
Credit metrics40 (𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼) and (𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼) are exogenously determined by credit rating 
agencies and are outlined in Table 3.  Values for 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹 are exogenously determined by 
project banks and depend on technology (i.e. thermal vs. renewable) and the extent 
of energy market exposure, that is whether a Power Purchase Agreement exists or 
not.  For clarity, 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑗
𝑖 is ‘Funds From Operations’ while 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 are the 











𝑖] . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1  ,           (A.15) 
 
At this point, all of the necessary conditions exist to produce estimates of the long run 
marginal cost of power generation technologies along with relevant equations to 
solve for the price (𝑝𝑖𝜀) given expected equity returns (𝐾𝑒) whilst simultaneously 
meeting the constraints of 𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼 and 𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼 or 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹given the relevant business 
combinations.  The primary objective is to expand every term which contains 𝑝𝑖𝜀.  
Expansion of the EBITDA and Tax terms is as follows: 
 
0 = −𝑋0














𝑖 ) . 𝜏𝑐] . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − 𝐷0,
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1                        (A.16) 
 
The terms are then rearranged such that only the 𝑝𝑖𝜀 term is on the left-hand side of 
the equation: 
 
Let 𝐼𝑅𝑅 ≡  𝐾𝑒   
 
∑ (1 − 𝜏𝑐).𝑝𝑖 . 𝑞𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅. (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 = 𝑋0
𝑖 − ∑ [−(1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − (1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗







𝑖 ). (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)] + ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) +𝐷0
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1 ,                    (A.17) 
 
 
40 For Balance Sheet Financings, Funds From Operations over Interest, and Net Debt to EBITDA respectively. For 
Project Financings, Debt Service Cover Ratio and Loan Life Cover Ratio.  
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The model then solves for 𝑝𝑖𝜀 such that: 
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APPENDIX II – NEMESYS Model Overview 
 
In the Model, let H be the ordered set of all half-hourly trading intervals. 
 
𝑖 ∈ {1… |𝐻|} ∧ ℎ𝑖 ∈ 𝐻,                                 (A.19) 
 
Let Ɲ be the ordered set of nodes within the regional power system and let |Ɲ| be the 
total number of nodes in the set.  Let ƞ𝑛 be node 𝑛 where:  
 
𝑛 ∈  (1. . |Ɲ|) ∧  ƞ𝑛 ∈  Ɲ,                                (A.20) 
 
Aggregate demand at each node comprises residential, commercial and industrial 
consumer segments.  Let E be the set of all electricity consumers in the model. 
 
𝑤 ∈ {1… |𝐸|} ∧ 𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝐸, (A.21) 
 
Let 𝑉𝑤(𝑞) be the valuation that consumer segment 𝑤 is willing to pay for quantity 𝑞 
MWh of electricity.  Let 𝑞𝑤,𝑛
𝑖  be the metered quantity consumed by customer 
segment 𝑤 in each trading interval 𝑖 at node 𝑛 expressed in Megawatt hours (MWh).  
In all scenarios and iterations, aggregate demand is modelled as a strictly decreasing 
and linear function with own price elasticity of -0.10 applied by reference to average 
wholesale prices 𝑝 against the ‘base case’. 
 
Generation investment and spot market trading are assumed to be profit maximising 
in a perfectly competitive market with all firms being price takers, thus yielding 
welfare maximising outcomes.  Let Ψ𝑛 be the ordered set of generators at node 𝑛   
 
ℊ ∈ {1. . |Ψ𝑛|} ∧ 𝜓𝑛ℊ ∈ Ψ𝑛,                               (A.22) 
 
Conventional plant are subject to random maintenance outages.  F(𝑛,ℊ, 𝑖) is the 





𝑔=0 (𝑛,ℊ, 𝑖) ∀ ƞ𝑛,                                  (A.23) 
 
Conventional plant face binding capacity limits and minimum stable load constraints.  
Let ?̂?𝜓𝑛ℊ be the maximum productive capacity of generator 𝜓𝑛ℊ at node 𝑛 and let ?̌?𝜓𝑛ℊ 
be the minimum stable load of generator 𝜓𝑛.  Plant marginal running costs are given 
by 𝑚𝑐𝑛ℊ. Let 𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖  be generation dispatched (and metered) at node 𝑛 by generator 𝜓𝑛 
in each trading interval 𝑖 expressed in MWh.  Let 𝑑𝑛
𝑖  be the cleared quantity of 
electricity delivered in trading interval 𝑖 at node 𝑛 expressed in MWh.   
 
Let 𝑝𝜓𝑖(𝑞) be the uniform clearing price that all dispatched generators receive for 
generation dispatched, 𝑔𝜓𝑛𝑖 .  Were it not for network constraints, generation and 









𝑖 ),                                (A.24) 






  ≠ 0, 0 < ?̌?𝜓𝑛ℊ < 𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖
< ?̂?𝜓𝑛ℊ∀ 𝜓𝑛
= 0, 0                                                
⋀ [(∑𝑞𝑤,𝑛
𝑖 − ∑𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖 ) ∑𝑞𝑤,𝑛
𝑖⁄ ] ≯ 𝑈𝑆𝐸,   
                                             (A.25) 




𝑖 − ∑𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖 > 0|𝑈𝑆𝐸 > 0, 𝑝𝜓𝑖(𝑞) = $15,000/MWh, ),             (A.26) 
 
Unserved Energy (𝑈𝑆𝐸) defines the reliability constraint.  In the model, the NEM’s 
reliability standard is used with 𝑈𝑆𝐸 not to exceed 0.002%.  Eq.(7) constrains unit 
commitment of each generator 𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖  to within their credible operating envelope, and 
for the market as a whole to operate within the reliability constraint, 𝑈𝑆𝐸.  Eq.(8) 
specifies that any period involving load shedding, market clearing prices default to 
the Value of Lost Load of $15,000/MWh, noting this has a tight nexus with the 
reliability standard (which modelling results subsequently reveal).41  
 
Let ₮ be the ordered set of all transmission lines 𝑡𝑗 and let |₮| be the number of 
transmission lines in the zone.   
 
𝑡𝑗  ∈  (1. . |₮|) ∧  𝑡𝑗 ∈  ₮,                                (A.27)
       
Let Ω𝐴 and Ω𝐵 be two nodes directly connected to transmission line 𝑡𝑗 where  
 
Ω𝐴 ∈  Ɲ, ⋀ Ω𝐵 ∈ Ɲ |Ω𝐴 ≠Ω𝐵,                             (A.28)
     
Let 𝑓𝐴𝐵 be the flow between the two nodes.  Let 𝑓𝑗 be the maximum allowed flow 
along transmission line 𝑡𝑗 and let 𝑓𝑗 be the maximum reverse flow.   
 
The clearing vector of quantities demanded 𝑞𝑛
𝑖  or supplied at node 𝑛 in each trading 
interval 𝑖 is given by the sum of flows across all transmission lines starting at that 
node, less flows across transmission lines ending at that node, if applicable.  Net 
positive quantities at a node are considered to be net supply 𝑔𝜓𝑛𝑖  (𝑖. 𝑒. ∑𝑔𝜓𝑛ℊ𝑖 ) and 










                                 (A.29) 
 
Integration of plant costs in the model centres around the transposition of three key 
variables, Marginal Running Costs 𝑚𝑐𝜓𝑛 Fixed O&M Costs 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝜓𝑛 & where applicable 
(annualised) new entrant generator Capital Costs, 𝐾𝜓𝑛 and (annualised) new 
Transmission line Capital Costs, 𝐾𝑡𝑗.  These parameters are the key variables in the 
half-hourly power system model and are used extensively to meet the objective 
function. 
 
Optimal welfare will be reached by maximising the sum of producer and consumer 
surplus, given by the integrals of demand curves less marginal electricity production 
costs and any (annualised) generation 𝐾𝜓𝑛 or transmission 𝐾𝑡𝑗 augmentation costs. 
The objective function is therefore expressed as: 
 
 
41 From a power system planning perspective, the overall objective function is to minimise 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 𝑥 𝑈𝑆𝐸 +
 ∑ 𝑐(𝐺)𝑛𝑖=1  | 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 𝑥 𝑈𝑆𝐸 + 𝑐(?̅?) = 0, where 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 is the Value of Lost Load, 𝑈𝑆𝐸 is Unserved Energy, and where 𝑐(𝐺) 
is the cost generation plant, and 𝑐(?̅?) is the cost of peaking plant capacity.  Provided these conditions hold, it can be 
said there is a direct relationship between Reliability and the VoLL.  An alternate expression where reliability criteria 
is based on Loss of Load Expectation is 𝐿𝑜𝐿𝐸 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐸/𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿, where CONE is the cost of new entry.  For an excellent 
discussion on the relationship between VoLL and reliability criteria, see (Zachary, Wilson and Dent, 2019). 
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𝐹𝑂𝑀𝜓𝑛 + ∑ 𝐾𝜓𝑛
|Ɲ|
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝐾𝑡𝑗
|₮|




0 ≤  𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑖  ⋀ 𝑓𝑗  ≤  𝑓𝑖  ≤  𝑓𝑗 ⋀  0 ≤ ?̌?𝜓𝑖 ≤ 𝑔𝜓𝑖 ≤ ?̂?𝜓𝑖.   
